Article Title：Objectivity and illusion in evolutionary ethics: Comments on Waller
Abstract：
In this paper I argue that any adequate evolutionary ethical theory needs to account for moral belief as well as for dispositions to behave altruistically. It also needs to be clear whether it is offering us an account of the motivating reasons behind human behaviour or whether it is giving justifying reasons for a particular set of behaviours or, if both, to distinguish them clearly. I also argue that, unless there are some objective moral truths, the evolutionary ethicist cannot offer justifying reasons for a set of behaviours. I use these points to refute Waller's claims that the illusion of objectivity plays a dispensable role in Ruse's theory, that my critique of Ruse's Darwinian metaethics is built on a false dilemma, that there is nothing to be distressed about if morality is not objective, and that ethical beliefs are subject to a kind of causal explanation that undermines their objectivity in a way that scientific beliefs are not.
Keywords: altruism; arbitrariness; Darwinian metaethics; false dilemma; illusion; intractability; justifying and motivating reasons; morality; objectivity; Ruse; ultimate justification; Waller
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006556229960
Source：BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
Welcome to correct the error, please contact email: humanisticspider@gmail.com
