Article Title：Scepticism: Epistemic and ontological
Abstract：
It is widely thought that sceptical arguments, if correct, would show that everyday empirical knowledge-claims are false. Against this, I argue that the very generality of traditional sceptical arguments means that there is no direct incompatibility between everyday empirical claims and sceptical scenarios. Scepticism calls into doubt, not ordinary empirical beliefs, but philosophical attempts to give a deep ontological explanation of such beliefs. G. E. Moore's attempt to refute scepticism (and idealism) was unsuccessful, because it failed to recognise that philosophical scepticism operates on a different level from that on which we make or doubt particular empirical claims. And, as I argue with specific reference to work by Nozick and Fogelin, Moores basic confusion is still widely shared in contemporary discussions of scepticism.
Keywords: scepticism; G.E. Moore; Robert nozick; Robert Fogelin
DOI: 10.1111/1467-9973.00148
Source：METAPHILOSOPHY
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