Individualism, type specimens, and the scrutability of species membership

2025-01-07 Classification：Philosophy Click()
Author：Levine, A

Article Title：Individualism, type specimens, and the scrutability of species membership

Abstract：
The view that species are individuals, as developed by Ghiselin and Hull, has been touted as explaining the role of type specimens in taxonomy. The kinship of this explanation with the Kripke-Putnam theory of names has long been recognized. In light of this kinship, however, Hull's account of type specimens can be seen to entail two related inscrutability problems - unreasonable limits placed on the nature and extent of biological knowledge. An appreciation for these problems invites us to consider the proper relation between metaphysical and epistemological inquires in the philosophy of science.

Keywords: essentialism; ostension; species problem

DOI: 10.1023/A:1010674915907

Source：BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY

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