Article Title：Literalism and imagination: Wittgenstein's deconstruction of traditional philosophy
Abstract：
In his later philosophy, Wittgenstein unlike Russell offers no theories, because he believes that philosophical theories are never explanatory. They try to imitate scientific theories, but they lack the empirical basis that gives science its explanatory power. Two examples of his deconstructive work are discussed. One is his critique of the theory that the direct objects of perception are always sense-data, describable in a radically private language. Austin too criticized the theory of sense-data, but Wittgenstein's critique, unlike Austin's, included an attempt to show what had made it so attractive to its supporters: it presented a picture of the human predicament that appealed to their imaginations. The second example is his critique of the theory of the pure ego, which tended to collapse into solipsism. This critique was developed in his first book. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, and his later deconstructive work was modelled on it.
Keywords: Wittgenstein; deconstruction; theory; therapy; private language; solipsism
DOI: 10.1080/09672550110103091
Source：INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
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