Article Title：The myth of the Turing machine: the failings of functionalism and related theses
Abstract：
The properties of Turing's famous 'universal machine' has long sustained functionalist intuitions about the nature of cognition. This paper shows that there is a logical problem with standard functionalist arguments for multiple realizability. These arguments rely essentially on Turing's powerful insights regarding computation. In addressing a possible reply to this criticism, it is further argued that functionalism is not a useful approach for understanding what it is to have a mind. In particular, it is shown that the difficulties involved in distinguishing implementation from function make multiple realizability claims untestable and uninformative. As a result, it is concluded that the role of Turing machines in philosophy of mind needs to be reconsidered.
Keywords: Turing machine; functionalism; multiple realizability; computational equivalence; philosophy of mind; Kolmogorov
DOI: 10.1080/09528130210153514
Source：JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL & THEORETICAL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
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