Article Title：Evolutionary epistemology, social epistemology, and the demic structure of science
Abstract：
One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as a Process (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the demic structure of science. I conclude that the social account can do significant explanatory work independently of the selectionist account. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demic structure of science points us toward an important set of issues in social epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process is correct, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solely on his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promising aspects of his theory.
Keywords: David Hull; evolution; selection
DOI: 10.1023/A:1006718131883
Source：BIOLOGY & PHILOSOPHY
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