Article Title：For a moderate relativism in the sociology of science. On the philosophical presuppositions and consequences of the new sociology of science
Abstract：
The new sociology of science makes the relativist claim that social factors influence the generation and evaluation even of valid scientific knowledge, and mainly for its relativism it is sharply criticized by philosophers. The central objections of the critics concern the philosophical presuppositions and consequences of relativism. It is thus objected, on the one hand, that the relativism of the sociology of science is based on wrong philosophical assumptions about science; and, on the other hand, that the reflexivity of this relativism leads to unresolvable problems. The article provides a critical examination of the arguments given for these objections, especially of Popper's rejection of relativism. A differentiation of two forms of relativism is proposed, and it is argued that the objections raised against relativism in general are justified for only one variety of relativism. While extreme relativism, holding that the evaluation of scientific knowledge is solely dependent on social factors, is indeed untenable, moderate relativism, holding chat social factors are co-determinants of evaluation, has plausible epistemological presuppositions and allows the reflexive turn of relativism. Since moderate relativism is coherent with the research programme of the new sociology of science and the philosophical point of view, sociology of science should opt for this form of relativism.
Keywords: sociology of science; sociology of scientific knowledge; philosophy of science; relativism; sociology of knowledge
DOI: 10.1007/s11577-000-0104-9
Source：KOLNER ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SOZIOLOGIE UND SOZIALPSYCHOLOGIE
Welcome to correct the error, please contact email: humanisticspider@gmail.com
