Article Title:Truth via anaphorically unrestricted quantifiers
Abstract:
A new approach to truth is offered which dispenses with the truth predicate, and replaces it with a special kind of quantifier which simultaneously binds variables in sentential and nominal positions. The resulting theory of truth for a (first-order) language is shown to be able to handle blind truth ascriptions, and is shown to be compatible with a characterization of the semantic and syntactic principles governing that language. Comparisons with other approaches to truth are drawn. An axiomatization of AU-quantifiers and a model theory for them is given, and an appendix contains a completeness proof.
Keywords: truth; Alfred Tarski; Deflationism; blind ascriptions; anaphora; semantic rules; axioms; completeness
DOI: 10.1023/A:1017515608543
Source:JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
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